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ABSTRACT 
 
Effects Of Labels On Visual Perceptions. (April 2009) 
 
Frankie Lara 
Department of Psychology 
Texas A&M University 
 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Takashi Yamauchi 
Department of Psychology 
Labels simplify our world by reducing complex ideas into simple phrases. Research 
suggests that labels even alter our visual perception to the point that we think images 
carrying common labels look similar to each other even when they are not.  The present 
study shows that this is valid for perception of human faces and reveals that labels 
carrying specific categories of meaning are particularly more powerful in changing our 
perception. In two experiments, participants were presented with a triad of morphed 
human faces paired with arbitrary labels. The meanings of these labels were manipulated 
to represent the belief, the food, the disease, or the “face’s” last name. The results 
indicated that labels carrying conceptual information such as beliefs, food, and diseases 
were particularly strong in modifying participants’ judgment of similarity of individual 
faces, whereas labels characterized with last names of faces were least powerful. These 
results suggest that how we visually analyze an object is not confined to sensory 
modalities such as sight, hearing, or smell, but also to semantic information we relate to 
iv 
 
it. In other words, we shape what we see in terms of what we know about what we are 
seeing 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We make sense of the world by simplifying and organizing it into meaningful ideas.  We 
do this by experiencing things in our environment with our five senses, and then use our 
minds to interpret what these objects mean. The use of language is a method we have 
adopted to simplify this process. Language has allowed us to use words as symbols and 
to represent concepts. When we see a sign that reads “wet floor,” “wet floor” is a symbol 
that points to a concept indicating a dangerous surface we should avoid. We are alerted 
by it and take necessary actions to avoid that area. Hence, labels can be a powerful 
manipulator of our behavior. But how powerful are labels? 
 
 Imagine that you are walking through a supermarket. It is filled with products tagged 
with labels such as “They’re Gr-r-reat!” and “They're Magically Delicious!” which are 
meant to provoke us in buying the products. This type of phenomenon has obvious 
psychological importance and is studied often in many different dimensions of 
psychology because it affects our wallets and our economy (Teisl, Rubin, & Noblet, 
2007). However, the impact of labels appears far more fundamental and deep-rooted. Yu 
and colleagues (Yu, Yamauchi, & Schumacher, 2008) investigated how labels affected 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of the journal of Memory and Cognition. 
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similarity judgments, or the process of comparing two or more objects to find 
resemblance (Gentner, & Medina, 1998). Philosophers and psychologists alike have long 
regarded similarity as the building block of human knowledge (Russell, 1945).   Studies 
have demonstrated that this fundamental faculty of perception can be modified by labels 
when they compete with one another, and the effect of labels appears both in adults and 
young children (Brown, 1957; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Waxman & Booth, 2001; 
Yamauchi & Markman, 2000; Yamauchi & Yu, 2008; Yu, Yamauchi, & Schumacher, 
2008). How? 
 
In one condition of the Yu et al. study, participants viewed three images, one target and 
two base images, and were asked to judge which base image was more similar to the 
target image (Figure 1). In another condition, labels were added to the images and the 
researchers examined how this would affect participants’ similarity judgments. The 
results of the experiments indicated that some labels could alter people’s perception of 
similarity significantly but others did not. An important research question is “why did 
some labels modify participant’s perception while others were ineffective?” 
 
In the Yu et al study, the only thing that changed between labels was their “meanings” 
besides the change of the physical appearance of the words.  Word meaning, however, is 
a broad concept and is learned and interpreted variously (Markman & Hutchinson, 
1984). To specify and extract what each participant experiences when reading each 
label, controlling and measuring the meanings of the label should be crucial.  
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In the present experiment this was addressed by giving participants the same arbitrary 
non-sensible word, such as “Infaduenza,” but gave them different descriptions for that 
word depending on the condition. For instance, one condition would describe 
“Infaduenza” as the name of a disease and another condition might describe 
“Infaduenza” as someone’s last name. Participants were shown a triad of human faces 
(Figure 1a) and were asked to judge which face, bottom left or bottom right, was more 
similar to the target face on the top. This method followed the tasks similar to the 
Gelman & Markman, 1986 and Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004 experiments. Figure 1a 
represents the no label condition where participants were given instructions to make 
decisions using the images only. In the remaining conditions participants made the same 
decisions, but each image had a label underneath it (Figure 1b). We measured the 
performance of participants’ judgments by recording the number of times they chose the 
face that physically dissimilar to the target image. Recording how often the dissimilar 
image was chosen allowed us to see how often the labels misguided the participants in 
their task. These conditions where labels were attached to the images totaled eight 
between-subjects conditions: disease same, disease different, last name same, last name 
different, belief same, belief different, food same, and food different. The conditions 
refer to the category of meaning that represents the label and whether or not the label 
attached to the dissimilar image agreed with the target image (“same” or “different”). If 
the label of the dissimilar image matched the label of the target image, then this 
condition was named “same” (Figure 1b). If the label of the dissimilar image did not 
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match the label of the target image’s label, then this condition was named “different” 
(Figure 1c). Note that these manipulations were given only to the labels and all 
participants received the same stimuli. 
 
Our hypothesis is that participants will choose the dissimilar image significantly more 
often when labels of different categories of meaning compared to when the images have 
no labels. In other words, we predict that participants will produce “error” in their visual 
perceptions more often when they are confronted with the competing influence of 
meanings of labels.  Our reasoning behind this assumption is that people have become 
dependent on labels so much that they can be misguided even in a visual perceptual task 
such as the similarity judgment we employed. When participants are faced with a 
difficult decision, they may become more confident in a decision if the labels agree with 
each other. Adding meaning to the label, we predict, should entice the participant to 
choose the dissimilar image more because it carries more informational weight about the 
image it is attached to.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
Experiment 1 
Participants  
A total of 174 undergraduate students participated in this experiment for course credit. 
They were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: no-label (n=35), last-name same 
(n=37), last-name different (n=35), disease-same (n=33), and disease-different (n=34) 
condition. The total number of participants was N=174. 
 
Materials  
Stimuli were triads of faces that were in color that either had a label or no label attached 
to them (Figures 1a and 1b). The target was an original picture of either a Hispanic or 
Caucasian face, and the two base pictures were a morph of the original Hispanic and 
Caucasian face. These faces were photographed with the consent of each individual. 
 
 In total, we photographed five pairs of original Hispanic and Caucasian faces (Figure 2). 
These photographs were cropped by Adobe Image Ready to remove their backgrounds. 
The faces were then imported into the Morph Man 4.0 (2003) software and were 
morphed into five pairs of 20 images, starting from the original Hispanic (Image 0) face 
and morphing towards the Caucasian face (Image 19) (Figure 3). Altogether there were 
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100 images that had varying degrees of Hispanic and Caucasian facial features: 10 
original faces and 90 morphed images. 
 
From the 90 morphed images, base pictures were selected controlling for physical 
differences between stimuli. Specifically we developed three levels of physical 
difference- low, medium and high physical difference within conditions – based on the 
degree of merging two of the original face pairs. In the low physical difference condition 
there is a small amount of physical difference between the two base picture, or, the 
appear to look very much like each other (Figure 4a); in the medium physical difference 
condition, the base pictures appear mildly similar to each other (Figure 4b); and in the 
high physical difference condition, the images looked very different from each other 
(Figure 4c). Two sets of base pictures were randomly selected at each level of physical 
difference and were combined with two original pictures in each pair, yielding 12 triads 
for each pair (a total of 60 triads = 5 face pairs X 12 triads). 
 
Design  
The experiment had a 3 (Physical Difference; low, medium, and high; within-subjects) X 
5 (Label Condition; no-label, last-name same, last-name different, disease-same, and 
disease-different; between-subjects) mixed design. The meaning for the labels was 
described only in the introductory instructions. The labels between each condition were 
physically the same, but the story about the labels was altered (Figure 5a, 5b, and 5c). 
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Procedure 
 Participants were shown 60 triads of pictures, one at a time, and judged which base 
picture within the triad was more similar to the target image. This was done by pressing 
either the right or left arrow key, which were designated by the position of the base 
picture (base image on the left or base image on the right). The order of presenting the 
stimuli was determined randomly and the experiment took approximately 15 minutes to 
complete. 
 
 
Experiment 2 
Participants  
A total of 191 undergraduate students participated in this experiment for course credit. 
They were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: no-label (n=39), food-same 
(n=38), food-different (n=35), belief-same (n=40), and belief-different (n=39) condition.  
 
Materials and procedure  
The materials and procedure used in Experiment 2 were identical to those described in 
Experiment 1. 
 
Design  
The experiment had a 3 (Physical Difference; low, medium, and high; within-subjects) X 
5 (Label Condition; no-label, food-same, food-different, belief-same, and belief-
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different; between-subjects) mixed design. The meaning of the labels was specified only 
in the introductory instructions, and no labels were attached to face pictures in the no-
label condition. Except for these points, all participants received identical stimuli (Figure 
5a, 5b, and 5c). 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Do labels with different categories of meaning have a significant effect on our visual 
perception? As predicted certain labels produced stronger effects on the participant’s 
similarity judgment. Specifically, when compared to the no label condition, the belief, 
food, and disease categories produced significant results, while the labels associated with 
the last name of faces produced null effects. Note that the only thing that was allowed to 
change between each of the label conditions was the prompt in the instructions which 
gave the non-sensible words their meaning. Therefore, the effects created by the labels 
were solely produced by the category of meaning they possessed. We believe that 
participants used the meanings of the labels to shape their perceptions in their similarity 
task. The results also suggested that the stronger effects came from the strength in the 
relationship of the meanings of each label in relation to the images they are attached to. 
 
 
Experiment 1  
In Experiment 1, participants were told that the labels represented either a disease the 
faces had, or the last name of that person, or no label. These labels also were broken 
down further into conditions where the labels of the dissimilar image either matched the 
target image (same) or did not match the target image (different). Five between 
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conditions were actually used, designated as “disease same”, “disease different”, “no 
label”, “last name same”, and “last name different.”  
 
Disease-label vs. last-name-label vs. no-label   
To paint a broader picture of the effects of Experiment 1, we first analyzed the main 
effect of the label condition. Testing all levels showed a significant main effect of labels; 
F(4, 167) = 8.43, MSE = .08, p < .01, η2 = .17. Figure 6b presents a graph comparing the 
means of each label condition. To gain further insight, the results from pair-wise 
comparisons are reported below. To accommodate the effect of multiple comparisons, 
we set the alpha level at 0.01 
 
Same-label vs. no-label 
Disease-same vs. last-name-same vs. no-label  
As predicted, when participants saw a label attached to an image that matched the label 
of the target image, they tended to choose dissimilar images more often;  F(2, 101) = 
5.58, MSE = .1, p < .01, η2 = .01. The proportion of participants selecting the dissimilar 
image was higher in the disease-same condition (M = 0.31) than in the no-label condition 
(M = 0.17), t(65) = 3.11, SE = .05, p < .01, d = .76. The proportion of participants 
selecting the incorrect image was not statistically different in the last name-same 
condition (M = 0.22) and in the no-label condition;  t(69) = 1.84, SE = .03, p = .07, d = 
.44.    
 
  11 
Comparisons between the disease-same and no-label condition at the three levels of 
physical differences suggest that  participants in the disease-same condition selected 
dissimilar images significantly more often than participants in the no-label condition at 
all levels of physical difference: low at (M = 0.46), t(65) = 2.71, SE = .05, p = .009, d = 
0.66, medium at (M = 0.28), t(65) = 2.81, SE = .05, p = .007, d = 0.69, and high at (M = 
0.21), t(65) = 3.16, SE = .06, p = .002, d = 0.77.  
 
The performance in the last-name same condition and that in the no-label condition were 
statistically indistinguishable; at the low level condition,  (M = 0.37), t(69) = 1.13, SE = 
.04, p = .26, d = 0.27, medium condition (M = 0.19), t(69) = 1.82, SE = .03, p = .07, d = 
0.43 and high condition (M = 0.1), t(69) = 1.92, SE = .03, p = .06, d = 0.45. 
 
Different-label vs. no-label 
Disease-different vs. last-name-different vs. no-label 
As predicted, when participants saw a label attached to an image that did not match the 
label of the target image, they tended not to select dissimilar images; F(2, 99) = 2.40, 
MSE = .04, p = .1, η2 = .05. Planned comparisons show that this was significant between 
the disease different condition (M = 0.11) and the no-label condition (M = 0.17), t(66) = 
3.43, SE = .02, p < .01, d = .83. In contrast, the last-name different condition (M = 0.13) 
was not significantly different from the no-label condition t(66) = 1.13, SE = .03, p = 
.26, d = .27. 
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The disease-different condition and the no-label condition were significantly different at 
the low physical difference level (M = 0.2), t(66) = 4.58, SE = .03, p < .01, d = 1.11, but 
not at the other levels of physical difference; the medium level (M = 0.08), t(66) = 2.13, 
SE = .02, p = .04, d = 0.52, and high level (M = 0.03), t(66) = 0.00, SE = .01, p = 1.00, d 
= 0.00. 
 
The last-name different conditions all produced null effects with the exception of the low 
physical difference condition; M = 0.23, t(66) = 2.7, SE = .04, p < .01, d = 0.65; medium 
level condition, M = 0.11, t(66) = 0.6, SE = .03, p = .55, d = 0.14;  and the high level 
condition, M = 0.05, t(66) = 0.62, SE = .03, p = .54, d = 0.15.  
 
Disease-same, disease-different, last-name-same, last-name-different  
The four conditions were significantly different; F(3, 134) = 9.09, MSE = .10, p < 01, η2 
= .169. However, the difference between the disease-same and last-name-same 
conditions was not significant; t(68) = 1.79, SE = .05, p = .08, d = 0.43;  the difference 
between the disease-different and last-name-different conditions was not significant; 
t(66) = 0.80, SE = .03, p = .43, d = 0.19. 
 
Based on the results of this first experiment, it is apparent that not all labels containing a 
specific category of meaning are effective. The strongest effect was obtained in the 
disease-label condition when compared to the no-label condition. Also, it was apparent 
that, when compared to each other, the disease and last-name labels did not produce 
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significant results. In summary, it appears that category labels hold power over our 
visual perception when they hold a specific meaning, and the differences between these 
two categories is not significant. It can be speculated from these results that the 
meanings of the labels need to hold a specific relationship to the images they represent in 
order to have an effect. 
 
Experiment 2 
Once again, the labels used in the second group of experiments were the exact same 
nonsense words that were used in the first experiment. The only thing we modified was 
the introductory prompt that explained what these labels meant. This time we told 
participants that the labels either represented someone’s belief, what they eat, or no label 
at all. 
 
Belief-label vs. food-label vs. no-label   
As in Experiment 1, we first analyzed the main effect of the label condition. Testing all 
levels showed a significant main effect of labels; F(4, 186) = 16.80, MSE = .113, p < .01, 
η2 = .27. Figure 6c presents a graph comparing the means of each condition. This graph 
compliments the following break down of statistics in Experiment 2. 
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Same-label vs. no-label 
Belief-same vs. food-same vs. no-label  
As predicted, when participants saw a label attached to an image that matched the label 
of the target image, their was a significant effect in the participant's similarity 
judgments; F(2, 114) = 6.79, MSE = .17, p < .01, η2 = .11. The proportion of participants 
selecting the dissimilar image was higher in the belief-same condition (M = 0.36) than in 
the no-label condition (M = 0.18), t(77) = 4.04, SE = .05, p < .01, d = 0.9. The proportion 
of participants selecting the dissimilar image was significantly higher in the food-same 
condition (M = 0.33) than the no-label condition, t(75) = 3.14, SE = .05, p < .01, d = 
0.71. 
 
As in Experiment 1, we broke down the conditions into the within-subject factor 
featuring three levels of physical difference between the base pictures. The belief-same 
label condition was significantly different from the no-label condition at all levels of 
physical difference, t’s > 2.88, p’s < .01, d’s > 0.63. 
 
Comparisons between the food-label same and no-label conditions revealed significant 
differences at low and medium levels of physical difference; low level, t(75) = 3.32, SE 
= .05, p < .01, d = 0.75; medium level, t(75) = 3.10, SE = .05, p < .01, d = 0.7; but not at 
the high level of physical difference; t(75) = 2.41, SE = .05, p = .02, d = 0.54. 
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Different-label vs. no-label 
Belief-different vs. food-different vs. no-label  
As predicted, when participants saw a label attached to an image that did not match the 
label of the target image, they tended not to select dissimilar images; F(2, 110) = 12.81, 
MSE = .02, p < .01, η2 = .19. In particular, there was a significant difference between the 
belief different condition (M = 0.10) and the no-label condition t(76) = 3.76, SE = .02, p 
< .01, d = 0.84. Similarly, there was a significant difference between the food different 
condition (M = 0.08) and the no-label condition; t(72) = 5.66, SE = .02, p < .01, d = 1.31. 
 
We broke down the conditions into the within-subject factor featuring three levels of 
physical difference between the base pictures. The belief different condition was 
different from the no-label condition at the low level of physical difference; t(76) = 4.92, 
SE = .03, p < .01, d =1.10, but not at the medium level, t(76) = 1.9, SE = .03, p = .06, d = 
0.43, and high level, t(76) = 1.89, SE = .18, p = .06, d = 0.43. 
 
The food different condition was different from the no-label condition at the low  and 
medium levels of physical difference;  low level, t(72) = 5.48, SE = .03, p < .01, d = 0.7, 
and the medium level, t(72) = 4.90, SE = .02, p < .01, d = 1.14, but not at the high level, 
t(72) = 2.13, SE = .02, p = .04, d = 0.50.  
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Belief-same, belief-different, food-same, food-different  
Once again, the label conditions yielded a significant effect when compared to each 
other F(3, 148) = 17.85, MSE = .14, p < .01, η2 = .27. However, the belief-same and 
food-same conditions were not significantly different; t(76) = 0.49, SE = .06, p = .63, d = 
0.11. Similarly, the belief-different and the food-different conditions were statistically 
indistinguishable; t(72) = 0.70, SE = .04, p = .49, d = 0.16. 
 
The results of Experiment 2 indicated that both the belief and food label conditions were 
significant in altering participant’s visual perceptions when compared to the no label 
condition. Also, as in Experiment 1, when you compare the two label conditions, there is 
no significant effect. It is apparent now that the relationship between labels and their 
images can be significant and meaningful even with rudimentary categories of meaning 
such as food. Once again we speculate that the relationship of the meaning of the label in 
relation to its image is important. It is easy to conclude the next step in these 
experiments is to systematically determine what categories of meaning hold the most 
weight in this type of visual perception study.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Do labels effect our perception of human faces? As predicted, the results indicate that 
labels did affect the participant’s ability to perceive human faces. The participants were 
given a similarity task comparing faces and chose the dissimilar face more often than 
chance would allow. Specifically, participants chose the dissimilar face when they were 
told that the labels represented the name of belief, food, or disease. These results suggest 
that how we visually analyze an object is not confined to sensory modalities such as 
sight, hearing, or smell, but also to semantic information we relate to it. In other words, 
we shape what we see in terms of what we know about what we are seeing (Eberhardt, 
Dasgupta, & Banaszynski, 2003). A positive implication to these findings is that we can 
understand and interpret people more simply because we are able to put people in similar 
categories by what we know about them, and not just how they look. The danger in these 
findings, and a possible source of future research, are that these labels may be too 
misleading and we may overestimate similarities in people. Stereotypes are an easy 
example of this fallacy (Carnaghi & Maass, 2007).  
 
Do certain labels have greater effects on visual perception? As predicted, some labels 
had greater significance than others. Specifically, the belief label was the strongest, the 
food label was the next strongest, and the disease label was the weakest label that 
showed significance (the last name condition showed no significance). Although the 
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participants in every condition were told that the labels “meant” something, in each 
condition they were given the same list of nonsense (arbitrary) words. With all else the 
same except for the meaning of the label, it appears that participants presumed certain 
labels are more powerful in terms of their meaning in relation to the image. From this, it 
seems that participants put more value on what people believe in when judging the faces 
for similarity compared to any other label. It is interesting, however, that food was the 
next powerful determiner of people’s judgments. Perhaps this can be correlated to 
society’s emphasis on weight watching and physical appearance (McVey, Pepler,Davis, 
Flett, & Abdolell, 2002). What showed least significance was the last name label. 
Because there was no informational history put in to the last names, it was most likely 
hard for participants to gather meaning from this label.  
 
In conclusion, the results have indicated that labels do affect how we perceive human 
faces and that labels of different meaning hold different weights on these perceptions. 
Some research on racial face perception focuses solely on the physical perceptions of the 
face (Willadsen-Jensen & Ito, 2008). Research that incorporates labels and faces tends to 
change the actual label of the experiment (using real words), which altogether changes 
the meaning and appearance of the word(s). The current study contributes to previous 
research in that it allows “meaning” of labels to be manipulated in a more efficient way, 
so that there is more confidence that participants were manipulated by the category of 
meaning and nothing else.  
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APPENDIX 
FIGURES 
 
a. 
  
 
b. 
 
Figure 1. Samples of the stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2. (a) – the no-label 
condition, (b) – the same label condition, and (c) – the different label condition.  
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c. 
 
Figure 1 continued 
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Figure 2. Five pairs of real face pictures used to create morphed images.  
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Figure 3. Morphed images created from two original face pictures. One real 
Hispanic face is morphed gradually with one real Caucasian face so that each face 
picture depicts different degrees of ethnic features. 
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a. 
 
 
b. 
 
Figure 4. Three levels of physical difference. (a) shows the low level of physical 
difference. (b) shows the medium level of physical difference. (c) shows the high level 
of physical difference. 
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c. 
 
Figure 4 continued 
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a.
 
 
b. 
 
 
c. 
 
Figure 5. The instructions given in the introduction of the experiment. (a) shows 
a sample of the instructions for the no label condition. (b) shows a sample of the 
instructions for the disease label condition. (c) shows a sample of the last name 
condition. 
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Figure 6. Results from all experiments. (a) The results of all conditions combined 
from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. (b) The results from Experiment 1. (c) The results 
from Experiment 2. 
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c. 
Belief Label vs Food Label vs No Label
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Figure 6 continued 
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